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INTRODUCTION
The development of new technology has often begged questions
that are not answered by the previously existing legal framework.1
Current advances in modern technologies are no different and are out-
pacing legislative and regulatory developments.2 Lack of regulation
and a developed legal framework can make it impossible to control the
risks associated with new technology.3 Such non-regulation of mod-
ern reproductive technologies will ultimately lead to the unavoidable
commodification of motherhood.4
1. Ivan K. Fong, Law and New Technology: The Virtues of Muddling Through, 19
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 443, 444 (2001) (book review).
2. Gary E. Marchant et. al., What Does the History of Technology Regulation Teach
Us about Nano Oversight?, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 724, 726-27 (2009).
3. See id. (discussing “four potential problems that may result from the failure of
law to keep pace with technology”).
4. For a definition of “commodification,” see Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1859 (1987) (“The term ‘commodification’ can be
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Commodification of the womb, sex cells, and DNA will revolu-
tionize the way we view reproduction. This could potentially lead to
a change in the way society views the role of motherhood in defining
womanhood. Although this may be seen as an unwanted side effect to
modern reproductive technologies, it also seems virtually unavoidable.
Instead of spending time and legislative energy trying to prevent
commodification, the federal government, states, and medical asso-
ciations should focus on regulating the safety of reproductive tech-
nologies. In order to best protect women’s health and preserve their
decision-making autonomy, it is necessary that we accept the unavoid-
able commodification of some aspects of traditional motherhood and
focus legislative efforts on regulating the medical administration of
modern reproductive technologies.
I. RISE OF MODERN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
For the purposes of this Note, the term “modern reproductive
technologies” (MRT) refers to certain medical procedures currently
available that were developed with the intention of aiding human
reproduction.5 Specifically, MRT will refer to artificial insemination,
Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART), which include in vitro
fertilization, as well as surrogacy,6 and also to genetic engineering
and cloning of embryos. Each of these technologies will be discussed
in turn below.
MRT began with the birth of “[t]he first test tube baby” in 1978,
who was conceived through in vitro fertilization.7 More than thirty
construed narrowly or broadly. Narrowly construed, commodification describes actual buy-
ing and selling (or legally permitted buying and selling) of something. Broadly construed,
commodification includes not only actual buying and selling, but also market rhetoric, the
practice of thinking about interactions as if they were sale transactions, and market meth-
odology, the use of monetary cost-benefit analysis to judge these interactions. Universal
commodification embraces this broad construction in its most expansive form, limiting
actual buying and selling only by the dictates of market methodology, and solving problems
of contested commodification by making everything in principle a commodity.” (internal
citations omitted)).
5. For an overview of several forms of technology-aided reproductive methods, see
Murray L. Manus, The Proposed Model Surrogate Parenthood Act: A Legislative Response
to the Challenges of Reproductive Technology, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 671, 677-79 (1996).
6. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention define ART as “all fertility treat-
ments in which both eggs and sperm are handled.” Assisted Reproductive Technology, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ART (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
According to this definition, ART does not encompass artificial insemination because sperm
is the only thing handled. Id. Nor does ART include the administration of medicine to
increase egg production. Id. Medical treatment is only categorized as ART if both an egg
and sperm are manipulated together with the intention of creating a baby. Id.
7. Ruby L. Lee, Note, New Trends in Global Outsourcing of Commercial Surrogacy:
A Call for Regulation, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 275, 275 (2009).
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years later, what once seemed like science fiction8 has become com-
mon practice. In 2006 alone, the number of “test-tube” babies born in
the United States numbered 54,656.9 More impressively, if the re-
cent trend continues, the number of “test-tube” births will continue
to rise.10
There seem to be at least two cooperating theories seeking to
explain the growth in the MRT market. The first theory is that high
infertility rates have created a large group of people looking for alter-
native means to start a family.11 MRT offers infertile parents the
chance to conceive a child that is biologically their own,12 fulfilling a
desire to unite a family through “flesh and blood.”13 MRT can provide
the closest substitute for natural conception because the resulting
child can be genetically linked to both parents.
The second theory is that the definition of the modern family has
broadened the MRT consumer base to more than just young, infer-
tile, married couples.14 Over time, there has been increased cultural
acceptance of both MRT and non-traditional family structures.15 “Non-
traditional” families might include those with a single parent,16 homo-
sexual parents, older parents, and career-focused mothers. In order
to have children, many of these modern families are turning to MRT.17
8. See The First Test-Tube Baby, TIME, July 31, 1978, http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,946934,00.html (comparing the first test-tube baby to the reproduc-
tion methods described in Aldous Huxley’s science fiction novel Brave New World).
9. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2006 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY (ART) REPORT: SECTION 5—ART TRENDS 1996-2006, fig. 49 [hereinafter 2006
ART REPORT], available at http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2006/sect5_fig49-64.htm#f49.
10. See id. (showing a yearly increase in the number of infants conceived and born
through ART between 1996 and 2006).
11. Manus, supra note 5, at 676.
12. Id.
13. Janet L. Dolgin, Biological Evaluations: Blood, Genes, and Family, 41 AKRON L.
REV. 347, 366 (2008).
14. See Nadine A. Gartner, Lesbian (M)Otherhood: Creating an Alternative Model for
Settling Child Custody Disputes, 16 LAW & SEXUALITY REV. 45, 48 (2007) (recognizing
the “surge of lesbian motherhood” as part of the “ ‘gayby boom’ ”); Sherri A. Jayson,
Comment, “Loving Infertile Couple Seeks Woman Age 18-31 to Help Have Baby. $6,500
Plus Expenses and a Gift”: Should We Regulate the Use of Assisted Reproductive Tech-
nologies by Older Women?, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 287, 288-90 (2001) (noting that older
women now use ART more frequently than do younger women); see also Lee, supra note
7, at 282 (discussing the increase in the number of “career women” seeking surrogates to
bear their children).
15. See Jayson, supra note 14, at 290 (mentioning changing societal attitudes as a
contributing factor to why older women are seeking out ART at higher rates).
16. See Dolgin, supra note 13, at 355 n.39 (“ ‘Eight[y]-six percent of all children lived in
two-parent homes in 1950, as opposed to just 72 percent in 1990.’ ” (quoting STEPHANIE
COONTZ, THE WAY WE REALLY ARE: COMING TO TERMS WITH AMERICA’S CHANGING
FAMILIES 37 (1997))).
17. Jayson, supra note 14, at 290.
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II. CURRENT TECHNOLOGIES
Fiction writers like Aldous Huxley, in Brave New World,18 and
Andrew Niccol, in the motion picture Gattaca,19 have recognized the
possibility of a society that creates children in laboratories.20 Their
fantasy stories are becoming reality in today’s world of reproductive
technology. Despite the reluctance of law-makers to recognize the
drastic change that occurred when reproductive technology jumped
from the pages of fiction into our homes and communities,21 MRT is
firmly embedded in our culture.22
A. Sperm Donation
The most common form of MRT is in vitro fertilization (IVF).23
The IVF procedure involves removing unfertilized eggs from the in-
tended genetic mother, fertilizing them in a laboratory with sperm
from the intended genetic father, and then placing the fertilized egg
in the uterus of the intended birth mother.24
Sperm donation is an important part of IVF.25 Donors, other than
those with the intention of creating a child of their own, often donate
anonymously to commercialized sperm banks.26 Most anonymous
donors are motivated primarily by the promise of compensation.27
Some donors, however, claim to be motivated by altruism.28
The sperm donation process is currently regulated by the federal
government,29 individual states,30 and professional organizations,31
18. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (The Modern Library 1932).
19. GATTACA (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1997).
20. Bryan Appleyard, The Gene Machine, AUSTRALIAN, Apr. 21, 1998, at 11.
21. See Michelle Bercovici, Biotechnology Beyond the Embryo: Science, Ethics, and
Responsible Regulation of Egg Donation to Protect Women’s Rights, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L.
REP. 193, 194 (2008) (“The U.S. is far behind other countries in crafting a legislative re-
sponse to curb dangers inherent in advances in ART . . . .”).
22. See 2006 ART REPORT, supra note 9, fig. 49 (showing how, each year, the number
of infants born from ART has increased).
23. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
(ART) REPORT: NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT (2007), available at http://apps .nccd.cdc.gov/
art/NationalSummaryReport.aspx (select year 2007 from drop-down box).
24. 2006 ART Report Commonly Asked Questions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2006/faq.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
25. Vanessa L. Pi, Note, Regulating Sperm Donation: Why Requiring Exposed Donation
Is Not the Answer, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 379, 382 (2009).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. For a discussion of the societal perception of sperm donors’ altruistic moti-
vations, see Kimberly D. Krawiec, Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs: Price-Fixing in
the Gamete Market, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 61-63 (2009).
29. Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-based Products, 21 C.F.R. § 1271
(2010).
30. Pi, supra note 25, at 382.
31. Id.
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but there is concern that “[f]ederal and state regulation of sperm
donation lags far behind the constantly evolving science of ART, caus-
ing uncertainty, fear, and even medical harm.” 32 For example, even
though “the FDA requires [sperm banks to conduct] a donor medical
history interview,” 33 donors are not required to update their medical
files if diagnosed with a disease after donation, preventing individu-
als using donor sperm from knowing about potential genetic health
risks.34 The net result of the lack of regulation is a potentially in-
complete medical history for children conceived with sperm from an
unknown donor,35 frustrating the possibility of preventative care for
possible genetic disorders.
Further, sperm banks do not necessarily keep a comprehensive
record of the number of times a donor has donated sperm.36 Popular
characteristics can lead to demand for a certain donor’s genetic mate-
rial and can result in many children in one area having the same bio-
logical father.37 The resulting problem, termed “consanguinity,” is that
the children may eventually marry and reproduce with their own half-
siblings without ever having discovered their biological relationship.38
B. Egg Donation
Egg donation, like sperm donation, is becoming a fixture in the
MRT world.39 Perhaps unlike sperm donation, however, searching
for an egg donor has become a very public task. Publicly accessible
websites advertise the availability of “desirable” eggs,40 and hopeful
parents can even place advertisements for egg donors with certain
characteristics in periodicals likely to reach a target population, such
as college newspapers.41
32. Id. at 401.
33. Id. at 383 (citation omitted).
34. Id. at 390.
35. Id. at 389.
36. Pi, supra note 25, at 389-90.
37. Id. at 389 (describing a donor who “is the biological father of at least 36 children all
born between 2002 and 2007” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
38. Id.
39. Sarah Terman, Note, Marketing Motherhood: Rights and Responsibilities of Egg
Donors in Assisted Reproductive Technology Agreements, 3 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 167, 167
(2008) (“Each year thousands of young women enter the American gamete market as egg
providers.”).
40. See, e.g., A PERFECT MATCH, http://www.aperfectmatch.com/ (last visited Mar. 28,
2011) (“A Perfect Match . . . specializ[es] in the recruitment of intelligent, well-educated,
accomplished and affordable college-aged donors to be matched with intended parents who
need the help of an egg donor to create their family. We also recruit young, healthy gesta-
tional surrogates who are prescreened and ready to cycle immediately.”).
41. AARON D. LEVINE, HASTINGS CTR., SELF-REGULATION, COMPENSATION, AND THE
ETHICAL RECRUITMENT OF OOCYTE DONORS 25, 27 (2010) (“Three ads, in the Harvard
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Women undergoing the ovum donation procedure for purposes
other than to create a child of their own are often motivated by mone-
tary compensation.42 Many donors also state that they are motivated
by the thought of helping infertile women conceive a child,43 but there
is significant evidence that this is largely untrue.44
Ovum donation, also known as egg harvesting,45 is a complicated
process that is potentially very risky for the donor.46 First, the donor’s
menstrual cycle is synchronized with the recipient’s cycle using birth
control pills.47 Then, the donor receives a hormone suppressant to pre-
vent normal ovary function.48 Next, the donor receives another round
of hormones, this time to “hyper-stimulate” egg production so that
multiple eggs can be harvested at one time, increasing the likelihood
of a successful donation.49 The recipient also receives hormone medi-
cation to prepare her uterus for implantation of the fertilized eggs.50
The eggs are later fertilized in the laboratory using sperm do-
nated by the genetic father.51 After the fertilized eggs have reached
the proper stage of maturity, typically one or two of the fertilized eggs
are implanted into the recipient’s uterus.52
There are at least three distinct controversies surrounding ovum
donation. First, the egg harvesting process can pose high risks for
the donor.53 Egg retrieval surgery risks damage to blood vessels and
organs located near the ovaries and can possibly result in infection
Crimson, the Daily Princetonian, and Yale Daily News, offered $35,000, and an ad in the
Brown Daily Herald offered $50,000 to ‘an extraordinary egg donor.’ ”).
42. Pi, supra note 25, at 382; Jim Hopkins, Egg-donor Business Booms on Campuses,
USA TODAY, Mar. 15, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/2006-03-15
-egg-donors-usat_x.htm.
43. Pi, supra note 25, at 382.
44. See Krawiec, supra note 28, at 61-62 (noting that, despite the perception of an egg
donor as a “sunny Samaritan” willing to donate her eggs for altruistic purposes, without
compensation, women are likely to stop donating).
45. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 195.
46. “During the entire process, the donor is subject to a number of health risks, in-
cluding possible bleeding or infection during the removal procedure.” Id. at 194 (citation
omitted).
47. Patient Education: Egg Donation Process for Recipients, UCSF MED. CTR., http://
www.ucsfhealth.org/education/ovum_donation_process_for_recipients/index.html (last
visited Mar. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Patient Education].
48. Id.
49. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 195.
50. Patient Education, supra note 47.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 194; see also Emily Galpern, Beyond Embryo Politics:
Women’s Health and Dignity in Stem Cell Research, WOMEN’S HEALTH ACTIVIST
NEWSLETTER (Nat’l Women’s Health Network, Wash., D.C.), May/June 2006, available at
http://nwhn.org/beyond-embryo-politics-womens-health-and-dignity-stem-cell-research
(noting the health risks related to egg donation for stem cell research).
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and infertility.54 Additionally, as with any surgery involving sedation,
egg donation carries the possibility of “anesthetic complications.” 55
Studies have also suggested that there is a link between the hor-
mone therapy administered to stimulate ovulation and some types
of cancer.56
Beyond the proven risks, the complete list of potential dangers
posed by hormone administration is unknown,57 making it difficult to
inform donors of the actual risks of donation. The lack of knowledge
about long-term effects of the hormone therapy, combined with the ex-
pected risks in any invasive surgery, can create an ethical dilemma,
especially as “there is a conflict of interest between those seeking
eggs and potential donors . . . .” 58 The nature of the informed consent
required from egg donors is inconsistent and, at best, only vague in
its warning about health risks.59
The second controversy surrounding ovum donation is its associ-
ation with stem cell research.60 In the past, stem cell research relied
exclusively on the use of “leftover” fertilized eggs that were not im-
planted into the recipient during ovum donation.61 New cloning tech-
nology called “somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT),” however, requires
freshly harvested eggs.62 The ovum donation procedure is the same
for SCNT donation as for IVF donation.63 After harvesting, however,
instead of being fertilized, each egg’s nucleus is removed and replaced
with the nucleus from a somatic cell, or “body cell,” 64 resulting in an
egg that can be used to grow a stem cell line.65 Because DNA is con-
tained in the nucleus of a cell, each egg is a clone of the somatic cell,
rendering it ideal for research purposes.66
54. The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, EGG DONOR INFO. PROJECT, http://www
.stanford.edu/class/siw198q/websites/eggdonor/procedures.html (last updated June 5, 2002).
55. Id.
56. Helen Pearson, Health Effects of Egg Donation May Take Decades to Emerge, 442
NATURE 601, 607 (2006), available at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v442/n7103/
pdf/442607a.pdf.
57. Id. at 608 (“ ‘It’s important for people to understand in the consent process that we
don’t know as much as we should about what th[e] risks are . . . .’ ” (quoting Mildred Cho)).
58. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 210.
59. Id. at 209-10. For an example of an informed consent form used in egg donation for
IVF procedures, see the OHSU Center for Women’s Health website. Patient Handouts,
OHSU CTR. WOMEN’S HEALTH, http://www.ohsu.edu/xd/health/services/women/services/
fertility/patient-resources/upload/IVF-Informed-Consent.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
60. See Bercovici, supra note 21, at 195 (discussing the two markets of “the ‘egg
trade’ ”: “IVF treatments and . . . research purposes” (citation omitted)).
61. Galpern, supra note 53.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Stem cell research has been publicly condemned by pro-life
organizations as a violation of protected rights of an unborn child.67
Adding fuel to their fire, in March of 2009, President Barack Obama
signed an executive order lifting the ban on federal funding for em-
bryonic stem cell research68 imposed by President George W. Bush.69
Despite the medical breakthroughs predicted by those involved in
stem cell research,70 many pro-life supporters strongly oppose the
use of embryos, whether left over from the IVF process or cloned
specifically for research purposes, because all “embryos and fetuses
are human beings worthy of respect.” 71
The third controversy surrounding ovum donation is the potential
coercive threat it poses to economically desperate women.72 A woman
in a difficult financial position may feel compelled to undergo the dan-
gerous medical procedure to make ends meet.73 The concerns with
ovum donation for-pay are analogous to potential ethical concerns
regarding organ donation, or even prostitution, because of the risky
nature of the egg donation procedure, combined with the potentially
high financial pay off.74
Despite these concerns, compensation for egg donation is not
federally regulated.75 Instead, independent agencies have issued
67. Press Release, Nat’l Right to Life Comm., National Right to Life Says the Obama
Administration is Pushing Step-by-Step the Creation and Harvesting of Human Embryos
for Research (Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.nrlc.org/press_releases_new/Release
041709.html (“[L]ongstanding law . . . actually prohibits funding of research that creates
or harms human embryos, including all creation of human embryos by cloning.”).
68. Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (Mar. 9, 2009).
69. Daniel Nasaw, Obama Ends Bush Ban on Embryo Stem Cell Research, GUARDIAN
.CO.UK, Mar. 6, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/06/embryonic-stem-cell
-research-obama.
70. See, e.g., Stem Cells and Diseases, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://stemcells.nih.gov/
info/health.asp (last modified Jan. 7, 2011) (“Studying stem cells will help us understand
how they transform into the dazzling array of specialized cells that make us what we are.
Some of the most serious medical conditions, such as cancer and birth defects, are due
to problems that occur somewhere in this process. A better understanding of normal cell
development will allow us to understand and perhaps correct the errors that cause these
medical conditions.”).
71. Erin P. George, Comment, The Stem Cell Debate: The Legal, Political and Ethical
Issues Surrounding Federal Funding of Scientific Research on Human Embryos, 12 ALB.
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 747, 782 (2002).
72. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 197.
73. Id.
74. See Joseph B. Clamon, Tax Policy as a Lifeline: Encouraging Blood and Organ
Donation Through Tax Credits, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 67, 84-85 (2008) (discussing the
ethical concerns of being able to buy and sell life-necessary organs in a free market); Emily
Bazelon, Why Is Prostitution Illegal?: The Oldest Question about the Oldest Profession,
SLATE (Mar. 10, 2008, 7:12 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2186243 (discussing the ethical
considerations of legalizing prostitution).
75. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 204. In contrast, England’s Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority (HFEA) long “prohibited payment for egg donors, limiting donor
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guidelines defining proper compensation. For example, the American
Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) guidelines suggest:
Compensation should be structured to acknowledge the time, in-
convenience, and discomfort associated with screening, ovarian
stimulation, and oocyte retrieval. Compensation should not vary
according to the planned use of the oocytes, the number or quality
of oocytes retrieved, the number or outcome of prior donation
cycles, or the donor’s ethnic or other personal characteristics.76
The ASRM’s guidelines further state that “[t]otal payments to donors
in excess of $5,000 require justification and sums above $10,000 are
not appropriate.” 77 These guidelines, however, are merely advisory,
and agencies can choose whether to comply.78 The ASRM website lists
egg donor agencies that are in compliance with its guidelines but notes
that the agencies have paid a fee to be listed on the website and that
neither the ASRM nor any other authority has verified the agencies’
assertions that they are in compliance with the guidelines.79
Although some states regulate egg donor compensation, there
is no clear trend in the substance of the regulations.80 For example,
Louisiana, one of the few states that specifically addresses egg donor
compensation, statutorily prohibits all compensation, and also gen-
erally prohibits egg donation,81 whereas Virginia specifically excludes
the sale of eggs from its prohibition on the donation of body parts.82
C. Commercial Surrogacy
Another controversial form of MRT is commercial surrogacy.83
Commercial surrogacy comes in two forms. The first involves paying
a woman to relinquish her parental rights after giving birth to a
child that is genetically her own.84 The second form, “gestational
compensation to fifteen pounds (approximately thirty dollars) plus reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses incurred.” Id. at 204-05 (citing Press Release, Human Fertilisation & Embryology
Auth., HFEA Confirms UK Position on Payment for Egg Donors (Feb. 25, 2004), available
at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/784.html).
76. AM. SOC’Y REPROD. MED., Financial Compensation of Oocyte Donors, 88 FERTILITY
& STERILITY 305, 305 (2007).
77. Id.
78. See LEVINE, supra note 41, at 26 (describing the fertility industry as self-regulated).
79. ASRM Patient Resources: Egg Donor Agencies, AM. SOC’Y REPROD. MED., http://
www.asrm.org/detail.aspx?id=856 (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
80. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 203.
81. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (2011)).
82. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-291.16 (West 2010)).
83. See Lee, supra note 7, at 281 (discussing the potential for “surrogacy agencies and
medical practitioners [to] employ[ ] unethical practices solely to generate profit”).
84. Id. at 275-76.
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surrogacy,” 85 is more common in modern society.86 Gestational sur-
rogacy requires ovum donation and IVF, but, instead of the fertilized
egg being implanted into the egg donor herself, the egg is implanted
into a third party who agrees to carry the child to term for a fee and
then relinquish all parental rights to the paying party.87 Gestational
surrogates have no genetic link to the baby,88 avoiding some of the
legal issues posed by early MRT litigation surrounding post-birth
parental rights.89
As with other forms of MRT, commercial gestational surrogacy
is not federally regulated in the United States.90 Some states have
adopted their own laws regarding commercial gestational surrogacy,
but there is no dominant approach to the regulation.91
D. Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) is used to diagnose ge-
netic or chromosomal problems in embryos before they are implanted
in the mother’s uterus.92 PGD allows potential parents to screen the
embryos for disorders such as Down Syndrome and Tay-Sachs.93
The PGD process works like any IVF procedure: the hopeful
mother goes through an egg-harvesting procedure, the hopeful father
donates sperm, and the eggs are fertilized by a technician.94 Only some
of the eggs will be fertilized successfully and begin the cell division
process.95 After allowing the eggs to grow for a few days, a techni-
cian will take “an embryo biopsy” and conduct genetic testing on the
cells.96 Embryos that have an undesirable trait are usually donated
for research purposes or discarded.97 Then, a few “good” embryos are
placed in the uterus.98
85. Id. at 276.
86. Id. at 275.
87. Id. at 276.
88. Id.
89. Lee, supra note 7, at 275-76 (mentioning the case of In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227
(N.J. 1988), which highlights the difficulties inherent in determining the parental rights
of a surrogate who uses her own eggs).
90. Id. at 288, 292.
91. Id. at 288-90 (discussing the “fragmented approach” of the states in regulating
commercial surrogacy).
92. Jaime King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of Preimplantation
Genetic Screening, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 283, 285 & n.1 (2008).
93. Id. at 290.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 291.
98. King, supra note 92, at 291.
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PGD can also be used to screen embryos for “non-medical” genetic
traits, such as sex, deafness, dwarfism, and blood and tissue type.99
This type of screening can raise ethical concerns and is much less
common than screening for medical genetic disorders.100
The limited use of PGD is due in part to the lack of reliable
genetic tests for many traits and lack of public knowledge of the
field.101 It is possible to imagine that, in time, parents may “screen
kids almost before conception for an enormous range of attributes,
such as how tall they’re likely to be, what body type they will have,
their hair and eye color, what sorts of illnesses they will be naturally
resistant to, and even, conceivably, their IQ and personality type.”102
The ability to select the genetic makeup of children could result in
extreme disparities between children of different economic classes,
making those whose parents can afford PGD smarter and healthier
than those whose parents cannot.103
The President’s Council on Bioethics doubts that the ability to cre-
ate such a “designer baby” is imminent but also recognizes that “PGD
risks normalizing the idea that a child’s particular genetic make-up
is quite properly a province of parental reproductive choice . . . .”104
Assuming PGD is in fact recognized as a “reproductive choice,” it is
currently possible to buy certainty that your child will be a girl, and
that she will be free from over 100 diseases currently identifiable
through genetic testing.105 Despite the controversial applications of
PGD, however, the United States currently does not federally regu-
late its use.106
99. Id. at 296; see also Susan M. Wolf et al., Using Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis
to Create a Stem Cell Donor: Issues, Guidelines & Limits, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 327, 328-
29 (2003) (discussing a case in which parents used PGD in order to ensure that the mother
would give birth to a child who would be a bone-marrow match for a sick sibling).
100. Id.
101. King, supra note 92, at 297-98.
102. Michael D. Lemonick et al., Designer Babies, TIME, Jan. 11, 1999, at 64, available
at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,989987,00.html.
103. See id. at 66 (describing “a scenario in which society splits into two camps, the
‘gen-rich’ and the ‘gen-poor’ ”). For a more frightening interpretation of the possibilities
of PGD, see George J. Annas, The Changing Face of Family Law: Global Consequences
of Embedding Physicians and Biotechnology in the Parent-Child Relationship, 42 FAM.
L.Q. 511, 526 (2008) (discussing how genetic engineering may result in the creation of a
“superhuman” that sees humans “as an inferior subspecies without human rights to be
enslaved or slaughtered preemptively”). Annas refers to this theory as “gender genocide.”
Id. at 525.
104. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE
REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES 95 (2004), available at http://bioethics.georgetown
.edu/pcbe/reports/reproductionandresponsibility/.
105. Id. at 90-91.
106. King, supra note 92, at 321.
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III. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT REGULATIONS
As indicated in the sections above, there is a lack of uniform, man-
datory regulation of MRT. There are, however, a number of regula-
tory forces that affect the current structure of MRT service delivery.
A. Federal Funding
The development of MRT is regulated in practice by the limited
amount of funding available for research.107 Without resources from
federal and private agencies, research laboratories are often limited
in the amount of resources they can devote to developing and improv-
ing MRT.108 In essence, MRT’s expansion is regulated by its limited
ability to advance without research funding.
Recently, however, the federal government has been relatively
generous with funding for MRT-related research. As of March 2009,
the federal government is once again allotting federal funding for
stem cell research in order to develop new gene therapies targeting
some of the human population’s most deadly diseases.109 An increase
in federal funding for new technology could improve MRT effective-
ness and applicability, specifically in relationship to the burgeoning
field of PGD.
Another example of federally-funded MRT research is the
National Human Genome Research Institute’s completion of the
Human Genome Project in April 2003.110 The culmination of the
Human Genome Project was the sequencing of the entire human
genome,111 which “gave us the ability to, for the first time, to [sic] read
nature’s complete genetic blueprint for building a human being.”112
The future goal of the National Human Genome Research Institute
is to use the power of sequencing to collect information about the
function of different genes so that we may more easily predict how
107. See id. (discussing the federal government’s limitation on federal funds for
embryonic research).
108. Id. at 322 (describing how this lack “of federal research funding has pushed repro-
ductive genetics out of the laboratory and into medical practice”).
109. See Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 46 (Mar. 9, 2009) (repealing the federal
ban on funding for stem cell research).
110. All About the Human Genome Project (HGP), NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH
INST., http://www.genome.gov/10001772 (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) [hereinafter All About
the HGP].
111. Human Medical Sequencing Program and Current Initiatives, NAT’L HUMAN
GENOME RESEARCH INST., http://www.genome.gov/15014882 (last visited Mar. 18, 2011)
[hereinafter Human Medical Sequencing Program].
112. All About the HGP, supra note 110.
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our genes affect our lives.113 If this goal becomes reality, it is possible
to imagine using PGD in order to select for a variety of traits.114
B. Self-Regulation
Doctors and scientists working in the MRT field are often free
from federal or state regulation and, instead, voluntarily self-regu-
late.115 There are a number of obvious ethical problems with self-
regulation, such as a desire to maximize profits by downplaying
risks, inflating success rates, and providing new, yet experimental,
treatment, potentially exposing patients to unknown risks.116 MRT
providers are also not licensed in any special way,117 revealing that
there is little to no uniform oversight of the procedures or reporting
requirements.118
Individual doctors also have the opportunity to regulate MRT use
by declining to enter into the doctor-patient relationship with some-
one interested in using MRT.119 Though a doctor can almost always
refuse to treat a patient, she cannot, within the bounds of professional
ethics, refuse treatment based on “a patient’s personal characteris-
tics if the treatments would be provided to other patients with similar
medical profiles.”120 This means that a doctor risks violating the eth-
ical code by refusing to use MRT treatment for the benefit of an un-
married woman or a woman in a lesbian union if the doctor would
treat a married woman with the same medical characteristics.121 That
is not to say that a doctor is limited to perusing medical records when
making her decisions with respect to providing MRT treatment. A
doctor can also “take into account known or reasonably suspected
characteristics that would render the parent(s) unable to deliver a
decent minimum of child-rearing.”122
113. Human Medical Sequencing Program, supra note 111.
114. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 104, at 91 (noting traits such as
“height, leanness, or temperament”).
115. Jayson, supra note 14, at 332.
116. Sonia M. Suter, Giving in to Baby Markets: Regulation Without Prohibition, 16
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 217, 253-56 (2009).
117. Id. at 252.
118. Id. at 252-53.
119. See Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers,
Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 64-65 (2008) (“[A] physician is free
to determine whether or not to enter into a doctor-patient relationship with a prospective
patient . . . .”).
120. Id. at 66.
121. Id. at 66-67.
122. Id. at 67. For additional information regarding a physician’s ability to deny care
based on her judgment of a parent’s child-rearing capabilities, see id. at 67-68.
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C. Federal Regulation
Federal regulations of MRT are currently found in the Fertility
Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act (FCSRCA),123 and in FDA
donor tissue regulations.124 The FCSRCA calls on the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to develop an accreditation pro-
gram that sets standards for embryo agencies.125 The CDC released
its “Model Program” in 1999,126 but state and individual-agency
compliance with the Model is optional.127 Importantly, neither the
FCSRCA nor the CDC Model Program include minimum safety re-
quirements for MRT procedures.128
The FDA donor tissue regulations do set standards for screening
and testing donors, attempting to reduce the number of infectious
diseases transferred during MRT.129 The regulations do not require
testing for genetic diseases, however,130 nor do they set standards for
MRT procedural safety.131
Non-regulatory federal bodies have attempted to address ques-
tions left unanswered by federal regulation. For example, the Presi-
dent’s Council on Bioethics issued a report in March 2004 titled The
Regulation of New Biotechnologies.132 The report makes recommenda-
tions for the appropriate use of MRT.133 The report weighs the ethical
concerns surrounding MRT, expresses growing uneasiness with its
existence, and recognizes the inability of current federal legislation
to fully address its legal and ethical implications.134
123. 42 U.S.C. § 263(a)(1) (2006).
124. Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-based Products, 21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.1,
1271.3 (2005).
125. Yaniv Heled, The Regulation of Genetic Aspects of Donated Reproductive Tissue—
The Need for Federal Regulation, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 250 (2010), available
at http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=11&article=8.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 251.
128. Id. at 250.
129. Id. at 251-52.
130. Id. at 253-54.
131. See Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-based Products, 21 C.F.R.
§ 1271 (2005) (lacking provisions for safety verification of MRT procedures themselves).
Although the lack of regulation regarding screening gamete donors for genetic diseases is
outside the scope of this Note, a poignant example of the deleterious effects of this “hole”
in legislation can be found in an article by William Heisel titled “Egg Donor Gives Life—
and a Death Sentence.” SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007, available at http://seattletimes
.nwsource.com/html/health/2004068536_eggdonor13.html (discussing an egg donor who
recently learned that one of the children conceived with her eggs has Tay-Sachs disease).
132. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 104.
133. Id. at 205-24. For example, the report calls for “increased oversight by professional
societies and practitioners.” Id. at 215.
134. Id. at 36-37, 171.
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The egg donation process itself, not even considering compensa-
tion standards, is largely unregulated at the federal level.135 The regu-
lations that do exist differ for the donation of an egg to produce an
embryo meant for childbirth and the donation of an egg for research
purposes.136 Clinics can voluntarily choose to conform to federal MRT
regulations.137 The lack of enforceable regulations raises concerns
for the health of the women involved in egg donation, as well as con-
cerns about whether the current system allows women to make truly
informed decisions regarding donation.138
D. State Legislation
One way state law regulates MRT is through physician and
facility licensure.139 Several states have also attempted to compensate
for the lack of federal regulation by passing their own laws regarding
MRT, in addition to any licensure requirements they may have.140 For
example, many state legislatures have statutorily created regulatory
schemes regarding commercial surrogacy agreements.141 Scholars have
broken down the various regulatory models for surrogacy contracts
into four distinct types.142
Statutes in the first category make all surrogacy contracts un-
enforceable in that state.143 States that have such statutes may pass
other statutes that define the “legal parent” of a child conceived under
the auspices of a surrogacy contract.144 Many of “[t]hese jurisdictions
have effectively chosen to subjugate the rights of the genetic/intended
parents to those of the birth parents.”145 Violation of the statute by
forming a surrogacy contract can cause the contracting parties to be
charged with a crime for which they may face a misdemeanor or felony
conviction and hefty fines.146
Statutes in the second category only prohibit contracts that will
compensate the surrogate for more than just her medical expenses.147
135. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 198 (“[T]here is at best a patchwork system of federal
oversight of reproductive services and research.” (citation omitted)).
136. Id. at 194.
137. Id. at 199.
138. Id. at 194, 207.
139. Heled, supra note 125, at 255.
140. Lee, supra note 7, at 289-90.
141. Adam P. Plant, With a Little Help from my Friends: The Intersection of the Gesta-
tional Carrier Surrogacy Agreement, Legislative Inaction, and Medical Advancement, 54
ALA. L. REV. 639, 649 (2003).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 650-51.
145. Id. at 651.
146. Id.
147. Plant, supra note 141, at 649.
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Controversy over surrogacy compensation can echo that of egg dona-
tion: critics are overwhelmingly concerned with the commodification
of the womb and even the commodification of children.148
Statutes in the third category address only parts of the surrogacy
contract or surrogacy law generally, avoiding broad prohibitions.149
Many of these statutes merely decriminalize surrogacy.150 Some
states have also passed legislation regarding the presumed parent-
age of children conceived through a surrogacy contract.151 These laws
may establish a preference for the biological parent, either the mother
or the father, or may involve some other calculation to determine
parental rights.152
Statutes in the fourth category explicitly make surrogacy con-
tracts legal and enforceable.153 While these statutes may seem progres-
sive, many of these states have also passed sister legislation, which
heavily regulates the situations in which surrogacy contracts will be
held enforceable.154 For example, some states require that a couple
prove medical incapability of conceiving “naturally,” while others re-
quire that individuals seeking to hire a surrogate be married.155
E. Effects of Unregulated MRT: MRT Tourism
Citizens from countries that have strict regulations concerning
commercial surrogacy travel to other, less regulated, countries, such
as the United States and India, in order to reap the benefits of MRT.156
These potential parents are looking for good technology at the right
price.157 Not only is commercial surrogacy an illustration of MRT’s
nature as a commodity, but it also shows that the domestic market
is not the only influence on MRT.
IV. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF MRT
The rapid development of MRT has posed many novel legal
questions concerning parental rights.158 The section below discusses
148. Id. at 652 (describing the fear of “baby-selling”).
149. Id. at 649.
150. Id. at 653.
151. Id. at 654.
152. Id.
153. Plant, supra note 141, at 654.
154. Id. at 654-55.
155. Id. at 655.
156. Lee, supra note 7, at 284.
157. Id. at 276-77.
158. See Barbara K. Kopytoff, Surrogate Motherhood: Questions of Law and Values,
22 U.S.F. L. REV. 205, 206 (1988) (discussing “just how unprepared the law is to deal with
the questions that are raised” by “surrogate motherhood”).
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two key cases in the development of surrogacy law that highlight the
diverging interests of “procreative liberty” and traditional notions
of family.
A. In re Baby M159
In re Baby M was the first major case in the United States to
grapple with the issue of parental rights when a child results from
MRT.160 The parties to the case were, on one side, the intended par-
ents and, on the other, a surrogate who was hired to conceive a child
with the intended father.161 Importantly, the surrogate mother was
also the natural biological mother of the child.162
The two parties created a surrogacy contract, but, after the birth
of the child, the surrogate refused to give the child to the intended
parents,163 even though the contract terminated her parental rights.164
The court held that the surrogacy contract was invalid and “restore[d]
the ‘surrogate’ as mother of the child.”165
The Supreme Court of New Jersey made clear that the egg and
the womb should not be treated as commodities; the court refused to
validate the “sale” by contract of the womb.166 Instead, the court held
that such contracts were contrary to public policy167 and endorsed the
Superior Court’s test for the award of parental rights by considering
“the child’s best interests,”168 an analysis typically used in determining
child custody rights upon family dissolution.169
It is undeniable that surrogacy scenarios create a complex prob-
lem in contract law due to the potential of extreme emotional vulnera-
bility among the parties.170 This might suggest—as the court held in
Baby M—that such contracts should be deemed against public policy,
and that disputes over parentage should be settled using traditional
family law. It is equally undeniable, however, that such concerns, and
159. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
160. Developments in the Law: The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1996, 2069 (2003).
161. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235, 1237.
162. Id. at 1234.
163. Id. at 1237.
164. Id. at 1238.
165. Id. at 1234.
166. Id. at 1240.
167. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240.
168. Id.
169. Linda Kelly, Family Planning, American Style, 52 ALA. L. REV. 943, 948 (2001).
170. Flavia Berys, Comment, Interpreting a Rent-a-Womb Contract: How California
Courts Should Proceed When Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements Go Sour, 42 CAL. W.
L. REV. 321, 331-32 n.58 (2006) (noting emotional and economic vulnerability).
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the resulting denial to enforce surrogacy contracts, can infringe on
“procreative liberty.”171
B. Johnson v. Calvert172
The California case of Johnson v. Calvert explored a question
left open by the New Jersey court in Baby M: how to determine paren-
tal rights of gestational, not traditional, surrogates.173 The Supreme
Court of California noted that though there is support for both the
genetic mother’s and the gestational mother’s parental rights174 under
California law there can be “only one natural mother.”175 The court
held that when there are two such conflicting claims of motherhood,
the woman “who intended to procreate,” essentially the woman to
whom the surrogacy contract granted custody, shall be awarded
parental rights.176
The Johnson court implicitly recognized that there is some allow-
able level of commodification of children and the womb;177the court
viewed the embryo and the womb as things that can be dealt with by
using normal contract principles without violating public policy.178
Comparing the “best interests” test used in Baby M with the
“intent” test later used by the majority in Johnson, it becomes clear
that MRT is changing the way courts and individuals think of the
definition of “family.”179 Notably, however, there is some reluctance
to embrace the change, as indicated by Justice Kennard’s dissent in
Johnson advocating for application of the “best interests” test for
parentage articulated in Baby M.180
V. CULTURAL RESISTANCE TO MRT COMMODIFICATION
Since the birth of the first test-tube baby in 1978, there have
been countless articles, books, and theories written regarding MRT.
171. John A. Robertson, Technology and Motherhood: Legal and Ethical Issues in
Human Egg Donation, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 10 n.29 (1989).
172. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
173. Id. at 777-78.
174. Id. at 782.
175. Id. at 781.
176. Id. at 782.
177. Id. at 785.
178. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783-84. But see Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother,
13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 429-33 (2007) (arguing that existing constitutional
jurisprudence supports granting parental rights to gestational mother instead of genetic
mothers, even where surrogacy contracts exist).
179. See Dolgin, supra note 13, at 371 (“In short, the presumption that both autonomous
choice and the preservation of tradition can be central to the construction of a family sug-
gests a contradiction at the center of society’s view of family.”).
180. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 789, 799 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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Arguments for and against the use of MRT are vehement. Regard-
less, the market for MRT services is growing.181
Ethical arguments against commodification of MRT are often
just another vehicle to argue about the ethics of abortion.182 “Pro-life”
advocates view embryos as persons,183 and so may have problems not
just with the commodification of the embryo and womb, but rather,
with any use of MRT, because it typically results in the production of
embryos, some of which will never be used or will be used for stem
cell research.184
Others taking issue with the unregulated MRT cite extreme cases
such as “octo-mom” Nadya Suleman, a single woman who requested
implantation of a large number of embryos in hopes of having multiple
children at one time, despite lacking sufficient income to support so
many children.185 It is argued that Suleman’s story is the perfect
example of how complete freedom of choice with respect to MRT can
lead to an unhealthy family situation.186 The response to Suleman’s
story not only caused “public fury and social hysteria,”187 it also led
lawmakers to consider legislation regulating MRT by limiting the
number of embryos that can be implanted during one procedure.188
An additional argument against commodification asserts that the
practice of buying and selling gametes can devalue human life and
harm “the dignity of donors.”189 Some argue that “[c]ommercialization
of gametes and embryos (putting a price on them by the donors and
the scientists who profit from embryo research) causes further harm
by viewing uniquely human entities as objects in commerce rather
than as inalienable symbols of humanity.”190
181. 2006 ART REPORT, supra note 9, fig. 49.
182. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 193.
183. Sherry F. Colb, To Whom Do We Refer When We Speak of Obligations to “Future
Generations”? Reproductive Rights and the Intergenerational Community, 77 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1582, 1601 (2009).
184. Id. at 1601-02.
185. See Alison Stateman, The Octuplets Mom Speaks, and the Questions Grow, TIME,
Feb. 7, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1877962,00.html (discussing
the negative reaction to Nadya Suleman’s delivery of eight babies).
186. Id.
187. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Why We Should Ignore the “Octomom,” 104 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 120, 120 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/34.
188. Id.; see also Camille M. Davidson, Octomom and Multi-Fetal Pregnancies: Why
Federal Legislation Should Require Insurers to Cover In Vitro Fertilization, 17 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 135, 135-36 (2010) (arguing that Congress should pass the Family
Building Act of 2009 or similar legislation mandating insurance coverage for in vitro
fertilization in order to reduce multiple embryo transfers).
189. Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, Commodification and Commercialization in Human
Embryo Research, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 39, 43 (1995).
190. Id.
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Many opposed to commodification also argue that compensating
women for their eggs can result in the exploitation of economically
desperate women.191 Compensation for egg donation has been reported
to range from $1,500 to $150,000, with the average compensation
falling between $4,217 and $5,200.192 As mentioned previously, the
ASRM recommends a maximum payment of $5,000, stating “sums
of $5,000 or more require justification and sums above $10,000 are
not appropriate.”193 The ASRM justifies these numbers by saying that
keeping the amount of payment low “minimizes the possibility of
undue inducement of donors and the suggestion that payment is for
the oocytes themselves.”194
VI. AN ARGUMENT FOR ALLOWING MRT COMMODIFICATION
Many of the arguments against MRT commodification cannot
withstand careful scrutiny and cannot be used to justify legislative
action. This section will address several of the more convincing con-
cerns regarding MRT commodification and argue that regulatory
efforts are unnecessary to address these concerns.
First, legislation is unnecessary to prevent socially undesirable
situations typified by “octo-mom” Nadya Suleman. Although perhaps
well-intended, state legislative efforts to set a maximum number of
embryos for implantation is redundant. Doctors are already able to
make recommendations about care and refuse any “treatment request
[that] is known to be scientifically invalid, has no medical indication,
and offers no possible benefit to the patient.”195 Further, a doctor can
refuse non-discriminatory treatment that “is incompatible with the
physician’s personal, religious, or moral beliefs.”196 It seems clear that
there is already precedent in the medical field for a doctor to refuse
implantation of a certain number of fertilized eggs when she finds
it inappropriate for the patient.
Second, the argument that commodification of MRT devalues
human life falls short, in part, because it is outrageous to say that a
child conceived using MRT or a child born from a gestational surrogate
191. E.g., Bercovici, supra note 21, at 197.
192. Krawiec, supra note 28, at 66. Krawiec is careful, however, to note that these
numbers are “self-reported” and may be unreliable, but she acknowledges that,
ultimately, these are the best numbers available. Id. at 66-67.
193. AM. SOC’Y REPROD. MED., supra note 76, at 308.
194. Id.
195. Code of Medical Ethics: Opinion 10.05—Potential Patients, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://
www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/
opinion1005.shtml (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (citing Opinion 8.20).
196. Id.
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is less of a person than those conceived or born in a more traditional
way. If this were the case, it is unlikely that MRT use would have
exploded in recent decades, with more than 400 fertility clinics in
existence197 and approximately 1.2 million women seeking fertility
treatment in 2005.198 Although the commodification of sex cells and
the womb may reshape the idea of how families are formed, the valu-
ation of the individual family members is certainly not affected.
The new conception of “family” may already be commonplace.199
Professor of health care law Janet L. Dolgin writes in her article
Biological Evaluations: Blood, Genes, and Family:
Many commentators—in universities, in courts, in the media,
and in private settings—have noted the increasing importance of
autonomous individuality and choice to understandings of families
in the U.S. For almost a half century, society and the law have
increasingly viewed family members—especially adults within
families—as autonomous individuals, free to forge their own bar-
gains within family settings. In consequence, families shaped by
individuals’ nontraditional choices are now commonplace.200
Echoing the majority in Johnson, Professor Dolgin specifically
notes the modern trend in recognizing “adults within families . . . as
autonomous individuals, free to forge their own bargains.” 201 Legis-
lation preventing a woman from contracting and making autonomous
decisions about her own body could, in fact, do more damage to our
modern conception of family decision-making than will the commodifi-
cation of reproduction by MRT.202
In a related concern to the argument that commodification of
reproduction devalues human life, some claim “that ‘paid surrogacy
within the current gender structure may symbolize that women are
fungible baby-makers for men whose seed must be carried on,’ ” 203
or that such a market for embryos “turn[s] ‘women’s labor into some-
thing that is used and controlled by others.’ ” 204 This point, however,
197. Daar, supra note 119, at 26.
198. Id. at 24-25.
199. Dolgin, supra note 13, at 348.
200. Id. at 347-48 (internal citations omitted).
201. Id. at 348.
202. See id. at 348-50 (discussing the tensions between traditional “flesh and blood”
family composition and new ideas about individual autonomy, decision-making, and
bargaining).
203. Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81
VA. L. REV. 2305, 2328 (1995) (quoting Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1849, 1935 (1987)).
204. Id. (quoting Debra Satz, Markets in Women’s Reproductive Labor, 21 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 107, 123-24 (1992)).
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ignores the fact that a woman is capable of exercising her autonomy
in order to make such a valid, legally-recognized decision for herself.205
Third, concerns that a woman cannot make MRT decisions for
herself without being exploited are likely exaggerated by an inappro-
priate viewing of contract law as strict and unyielding.206 Current
contract doctrine “aimed at deterring coercion and minimizing nega-
tive externalities . . . can obtain some of the benefits that are pre-
sumed to be gained by a family law approach.” 207
Arguments in favor of legislating a maximum compensation for
egg donors in order to curtail the potential for exploitation are weak-
ened by situations typified by South Korean stem cell researcher,
Dr. Hwang Woo Suk.208 Dr. Suk used his position of power to coerce
women into donating eggs for only $1,400.209 Two of Dr. Suk’s research
assistants donated eggs without receiving any compensation whatso-
ever.210 Imposing a compensation ceiling will not prevent situations
like those encountered by Dr. Suk’s research assistants. Existing
contract and tort law, however, can address Dr. Suk’s misconduct.
Those arguing for limits in compensation may also be concerned
that free-market sales have resulted in lower payment for eggs used
in research than for those sold to mothers hoping to conceive a child.211
The fear is that the dual market may create two distinct classes of
donors: one consisting of individuals whose eggs are desirable for re-
productive donation—typically white or Asian women who tend to be
“highly educated”—and another consisting of those whose eggs are
desirable only for research purposes, for which they would receive less
compensation.212 To prevent this problem, it might be tempting to
draft legislation that would require research laboratories to rely in-
stead on altruistic egg donation.213 Practically, however, the fact that
donation is altruistic does not affect the riskiness of the procedure
and, as demonstrated by the actions of Dr. Suk, altruistic donation
does not prevent coercion.
205. Id. at 2329.
206. Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate
Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343, 2344 (1995) (“Contract law need not be the cold, heart-
less, masculine doctrine that some feminists and family law professors accuse it of being.”).
207. Id. at 2344-45.
208. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 198.
209. Id.
210. James Brooke, Korean Leaves Cloning Center in Ethics Furor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
25, 2005, at A5.
211. Bercovici, supra note 21, at 197.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 198; Brooke, supra note 210, at A1.
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VII. CORRELATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS
In considering arguments for and against commodification, it is
informative to analyze potential double standards within the MRT
regulatory effort. Differences in compensation between sperm and
egg donation and differences in ethical concerns between surrogacy
and simple egg donation may reveal the dangerousness of legislation
aimed at “protecting” women from commodification.
First, a comparison of egg donation and sperm donation reveals
that there is little correlation between the dangerousness of the proce-
dure and the payment received for the gamete. As mentioned before,
egg donor compensation in the United States purportedly varies from
$1,500 to up to $150,000, with most clinics reporting that donors
receive an average of between $4,217 and $5,200 per donation.214
Dividing the total payment amount by the number of hours a woman
spends undergoing various medical procedures involved in ovum do-
nation results in a total pay of between approximately seventy-five
dollars and ninety-three dollars per hour.215 This payment is roughly
the same compensation rate per hour that men receive for sperm
donation, a virtually risk-free procedure.216 Although difficult to claim
with certainty, cultural assumptions that eggs are donated for altru-
istic purposes and sperm is donated for profit may be responsible for
the questionable cost-to-risk ratio of egg donation.217 Prejudicial legis-
lative efforts that set a compensation ceiling for egg donation, but
not for sperm donation, may reinforce both cultural assumptions and
payments for egg donation that do not correspond to the high-risk
nature of the procedure.
Second, as discussed previously, much of the concern regarding
compensation of egg donors is linked to a fear that economically des-
perate women may risk the invasive procedure in order to receive
reportedly high levels of compensation. This contrasts with the view
that opponents to compensated surrogacy take, which is “grounded
in a judgment that commodification of women’s reproductive capac-
ity is harmful for the identity aspect of their personhood and in a
judgment that the closeness of paid surrogacy to baby-selling harms
our self-conception too deeply.” 218 The concern that an individual
woman is not able to make a rational decision to donate her eggs
214. Krawiec, supra note 28, at 66.
215. Id. at 67.
216. Id.
217. See id. at 67-68, 71-72 (discussing cost-to-risk ratio of sperm and egg donation and
differing cultural assumptions regarding egg and sperm donors’ motivations).
218. Radin, supra note 4, at 1932.
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contrasted with the concern that all gestational surrogacy will de-
value all of humanity may reflect an incongruous societal conception
of “womanhood” and “motherhood.” 219
VIII. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO AN INEVITABLE “PROBLEM”
If there is one point of clarity in the MRT legislative debate, it
is that reproductive technology is here to stay. It prevents genetic
illness, it provides a solution to infertility, it is profitable, and it is
common. Yet it also seems fairly clear that something about the cur-
rent state of MRT delivery is not ideal. In order to provide a better,
safer system—one that recognizes a woman’s right to access reproduc-
tive technology as equivalent to a person’s right to contract, reproduce,
and make decisions—perhaps we should reconsider our regulatory
focus. Instead of concentrating legislative and regulatory efforts on
avoiding commodification through contracts and compensation, we
should focus on ensuring that the administration of MRT is done in
the proper clinical setting, with stringent federal requirements for
reporting, informed consent, and clinical trials. Federal legislation
is necessary to provide consistent and reliable protection for women
making the autonomous decision to use MRT.
As mentioned in the earlier discussion regarding federal and
state legislation of MRT, little attention has been paid to the safety
of women undergoing MRT-based treatment.220 In order to truly pro-
tect women, federal legislation should address both the physical and
mental health risks posed by MRT.221
The potential for mental health risks is often used as an argu-
ment against commodification, namely that women cannot rationally
choose to become surrogates because they are likely to regret the de-
cision.222 Although potential mental health risks may be serious, they
are likely exaggerated. “[F]ewer than one percent of surrogates . . .
change their mind” at some point during the surrogacy process and
take steps to become the child’s mother.223 This number is close to the
percentage of women who report regretting their decision to have an
abortion or to be sterilized.224 A logical interpretation of these statistics
219. See id. at 1930 (“Surrogates may feel they are fulfilling their womanhood by
producing a baby for someone else, although they may actually be reinforcing oppressive
gender roles.”).
220. See, e.g., Galpern, supra note 53 (noting that “[s]ome of the drugs used for egg ex-
traction have never been subjected to rigorous safety studies investigating their use for
the procedure”).
221. Andrews, supra note 206, at 2361-62.
222. Id. at 2350.
223. Id. at 2351.
224. Id.
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indicates that women entering into surrogacy agreements may be no
more vulnerable to experiencing regret than women making any
other long-term decision regarding reproductive health. Women enter-
ing surrogacy agreements, therefore, are just as capable of rational
decision-making as those choosing to have an abortion or become ster-
ilized and need no greater legislative or regulatory protection, as long
as they are fully informed of the potential physical risks.
Additionally, the American Medical Association’s position is that
gestational contracts should be strictly enforced, and that the risk of
psychological detriment to the surrogate mother is small and is out-
weighed by the surrogate’s lack of “genetic tie to the fetus” and the
“mutually beneficial” surrogacy arrangement.225 The AMA also posits
that traditional surrogacy arrangements, those in which the gesta-
tional mother also bears a genetic relationship to the child, should be
enforced, with the exception of allowing the gestational mother to void
the contract within a reasonable time after the child’s birth.226
Still, some may consider it an important goal to attempt to elimi-
nate even the small remaining risk to the psyche of the surrogate
mother in order to truly allow free contracting. To do so, regulations
could require surrogate mothers to undergo basic psychological
screening that test potential surrogates for duress or psychological
vulnerability.227 Just as surrogate mothers are commonly screened
for physical disorders that may affect the child they have contracted
to carry, they would also be mandatorily screened for issues that
might make MRT dangerous to their mental well-being.228
As noted earlier, there are serious health risks associated with
MRT procedures that have been virtually ignored.229 Emily Galpern
writes, “[t]he anti-choice movement’s single-minded focus on the moral
status of the embryo has put women’s health advocates in a defensive
position and obscured concerns about the safety of the procedure for
women whose eggs are being extracted.” 230 In order to protect women,
it is important to step outside of opposition to the commodification of
the womb and instead focus on how regulations can be imposed in a
way that will keep women safe from MRT’s medical risks.231
225. Code of Medical Ethics: Opinion 2.18—Surrogate Mothers, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://
www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/
opinion218.shtml (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
226. Galpern, supra note 53.
227. Andrews, supra note 206, at 2374-75.
228. Morgan Holcomb & Mary Patricia Byrn, When Your Body is Your Business, 85
WASH. L. REV. 647, 652-53 & n.21 (2010).
229. Galpern, supra note 53.
230. Id.
231. See id. (discussing regulations as one method for “protect[ing] the health and
dignity of women who provide eggs”).
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Galpern makes a list of recommendations that, if enacted, would
accomplish this goal of safety.232 Her recommendations include the
establishment of a federal regulatory body charged with “oversight
of drugs used for egg extraction” 233 and requiring clinics to report
any adverse effect on women who undergo egg extraction.234 These
regulations would create a better standard of care for women under-
going MRT by making sure that drugs and procedures are carefully
studied and adverse effects publically reported.
Beyond regulation, Galpern notes that “[w]omen and other disen-
franchised groups have often been used as guinea pigs in research” 235
and recommends conducting studies in order to fully understand the
long-term health effects of the drugs used in stimulation of egg pro-
duction and egg harvesting.236 She also calls for studies to explore an
alternative to the current egg-extraction procedure that would pose
less of a risk to the donor.237
If regulation were to establish clear guidelines for the testing and
use of MRT, its currently-unknown risks could then be discovered and
made public. Armed with the full knowledge of risks and benefits of
using MRT, a woman could give truly informed consent to MRT. This
would alleviate much of the worry surrounding MRT because it would
be certain that a woman was not coerced, and was instead making an
autonomous and informed decision to enter into a contract.
The idea of the modern family in the United States embraces an
individual’s ability to make choices about her family structure.238 It
has also been noted that acknowledging the freedom to contract is an
important element of recognizing the legal capacity of women to enter
into surrogacy agreements.239 As early as 1993, a court upheld a sur-
rogacy contract as valid, finding the “intent” of the contract to grant
parental rights.240 Although there are arguments to the contrary, there
seems to be a rallying force that would allow a woman the autonomy
to freely contract for the sale of her sex cells and womb. Relying on
the market-economy justification and existing contract law principles
“allows women to define themselves and their relationships.” 241
232. Id.
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235. Galpern, supra note 53.
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238. Dolgin, supra note 13, at 371.
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CONCLUSION
MRT will necessarily redefine some aspects of traditional mother-
hood as a commodity unless the government enacts laws regulating
the growth of the MRT industry. Such regulation, however, violates
the modern view of personal autonomy and should not be used to
“protect” a woman from her ability to freely contract. This is not to
say that MRT should exist entirely unchecked in the market. In-
stead, all legislative and regulatory efforts aimed at MRT should be
refocused to address the safety concerns posed by MRT procedures.
The federal government should require investigative studies to
explore risks of MRT procedures and should require that these risks
be fully divulged during the informed consent stage of any MRT ad-
ministration. Once fully informed, a woman will be better able to
evaluate the risks and benefits of MRT and use that information to
choose whether to enter into a contract for egg donation or surro-
gacy for a price that meets her autonomous determination of value.
Information, not legislation, will address concern surrounding MRT
and allow women using the technology to protect themselves.
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